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AbstrAct: This article argues that process philosophy and Hartmanian formal 
axiology are natural allies that can contribute much to each other. Hartmanian 
axiology can bring much needed order and clarity to process thought about the 
definitions of “good,” “better,” and “best,” about what things are intrinsically 
good, and about the nature and value of unique, enduring, individual persons. 
Process thought can bring to axiology greater clarity about and emphasis on the 
relational and temporal features of human selfhood. The nature and significance 
of personal endurance is emphasized throughout.
For many years I have been thinking off and on about how to combine 
and harmonize two philosophical perspectives that have greatly influenced 
me—process philosophy and Hartmanian axiology. Chronologically, pro-
cess philosophy came first. In the 1950s and early 1960s, I was a student 
of Charles Hartshorne and John B. Cobb, Jr. at Emory University, and of 
Robert L. Calhoun and many other theological luminaries at Yale Divinity 
School. I joined the University of Tennessee philosophy faculty in 1966. 
The following year, Robert S. Hartman came to teach in our department 
for a half-year at a time, the other half being spent at the National Uni-
versity of Mexico in Mexico City. While he was with us, and for many 
years thereafter, I was probably Hartman’s most severe critic, yet greatly 
intrigued by his teachings. Fifteen years or so after his death, I finally 
figured out that his most powerful insights into what and how we value 
could be separated from his utterly implausible excursions into infinity, to 
which I still have vehement philosophical objections. Since then, his ways 
of thinking about human values and valuations have slowly transformed 
my thinking, acting, feeling, and total personal outlook—though I still 
have a long way to go in self-development.
Process philosophy and Hartmanian formal axiology are natural 
partners that should be united. I hope to make a plausible case for this, 
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but first a historical note: this is not the first encounter of the two. In the 
1960s, Charles Hartshorne and Robert S. Hartman were very much in 
contact. Hartshorne replied to Hartman’s article on the ontological argu-
ment in his Anselm’s Discovery (261-65). Soon after Hartman published 
The Structure of Value in 1967, Hartshorne sent to John W. Davis, our 
department head, a brochure about the graduate program at The Univer-
sity of Texas. Handwritten by Hartshorne at the bottom of the page were 
these words: “I’ve been reading R.S.H. Fantastically ingenious and chal-
lenging” (Hartman, “Formal” 54, 125). In 1995 and 1997, Hartshorne 
wrote two letters to Hartman asking him to clarify his position on such 
issues as God’s necessary existence and the temporality of the human self, 
and Hartman wrote a response to him that I published in Formal Axiology 
and Its Critics (56-61).
My case for the claim that process philosophy and Hartmanian formal 
axiology are natural partners will focus primarily upon a process/axiologi-
cal analysis of “self.” Process thinkers heavily emphasize the temporal and 
relational aspects of human selfhood; Robert S. Hartman heavily empha-
sized the intrinsic worth of unique, enduring, human selves. I will argue 
that these two emphases belong harmoniously together and complete one 
another’s inadequacies. 
Axiology and process selfhood
“What is the meaning of ‘good’?” and “What things or entities are intrin-
sically good?” To these two questions, posed by G.E. Moore, Robert S. 
Hartman had plausible answers. “Good” can be defined formally, despite 
what G.E. Moore said about its indefinability; it means “concept or 
standard fulfillment.” To Moore’s “What things or entities are intrinsi-
cally good?” Hartman answered that individual persons are intrinsically 
good, as are other unique conscious beings like God. This essay will focus 
on individual human beings, but nothing here should be interpreted as 
excluding the intrinsic worth of animals or nonhuman entities. Panpsy-
chism just goes beyond the scope of this essay. Hartman insisted that 
every human being is unique and that our intrinsic goodness is tied to 
our uniqueness. Formal axiology, he said, affirms that the “highest value 
is the individual” (Structure 254). “Unique” is the value category that 
belongs to the realm of intrinsic value, the highest form of value; extrinsic 
“goodness” belongs to instrumental or useful values; “perfection” belongs 
to systemic or conceptual values (199).
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Hartman wrote that uniqueness is not a property of an entity; it is a 
property of its properties, specifically, the completeness of its set of prop-
erties. “Unique,” he wrote, means that an entity has “all the properties 
that it has” (“Sputnik’s” 15). Unfortunately, this definition is inadequate 
if “uniqueness” is supposed to distinguish intrinsically good things from 
those that are merely extrinsically or systemically good. All concretely 
existing things have all the properties that they have, whether individual 
persons, individual rocks, or individual concepts. “Uniqueness” usually 
means “having properties, or configurations of properties, that nothing 
else has,” as Hartman also acknowledged (“Formal” 60); but even in 
this sense human selves are not uniquely unique. All existing bricks and 
thoughts are unique, if only with respect to having their distinctive loci in 
spacetime, or their distinctive meanings that nothing else has. Alfred North 
Whitehead recognized that each “eternal object” (each systemic concept 
or its referent, Hartman might say) is unique. According to Whitehead, 
“each eternal object is an individual which, in its own peculiar fashion, 
is what it is” (SMW 159) and “any eternal object is just itself ” (171). 
The connection between the value of concretely existing human selves 
and uniqueness is much more tenuous than Hartman assumed. Being 
an unrepeatable individual human self is intimately connected with hav-
ing properties, but this connection requires explanation. Uniqueness is 
a property of intrinsically good individual entities, but it cannot be the 
only intrinsic-good-making property. All intrinsically good entities (e.g., 
persons) are unique, but not all unique entities (e.g., ideas, things) are 
intrinsically good. Only unique beings that also exemplify other properties 
like consciousness, self-valuation, others-valuation, thinking, deciding, 
feeling, etc., are intrinsically good. Intrinsically good beings are a synthesis 
of uniqueness with such additional intrinsic-good-making properties, 
perhaps not all of them, but at least some (e.g., consciousness). Just how 
far these properties can be extended down into the nonhuman world is a 
continuing topic of lively debate, especially among process thinkers, but 
that is another issue.
But what is a “property”? Properties are qualities or relations, some 
actual, some only possible. Hartman distinguished between thoughts of 
or words for properties, reserving “intensions” and “predicates” for these, 
and the actual or potential realities to which words and thoughts refer, 
reserving “extensions” and “properties” for these (Structure 31, 103). 
“Meanings” can be intensional, extensional, or both. Ideas are meaningful, 
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but so are their referents. Some if not all qualitative predicate/properties 
are inherently relational in nature, most obviously “intentional” concepts 
like “desire” and “love,” both of which require objects to complete their 
intensional and extensional meanings; desires are always for something; 
love is always for someone or something. Predicates and properties as 
understood by Hartman obviously relate closely with “eternal objects,” as 
understood by Whitehead (SMW, Ch. X). Eternal objects initially are only 
relational possibilities for actualization located in the mind of God, but 
they may also exist in actualities in the real world. People are composed 
of temporally ordered sets of concrete, determinate predicate/properties 
or eternal objects.
Throughout this discussion, I will assume that Charles Hartshorne is 
correct in holding that actual existence adds a definiteness, determinate-
ness, concreteness, “thisness,” or something to eternal objects that they 
do not have in themselves as mere possibilities (WP 31-34, 59, 95-97). 
This is why real people would have much more value than their mere pos-
sibilities, even if both contain identical sets of eternal objects (predicates 
or corresponding properties). Mere possibilities lack concreteness, which 
is an integral aspect of our actuality and uniqueness. Perhaps this is the 
real significance of the enigmatic philosophical judgment, “Existence is 
not a predicate.” Existence is not just another eternal object alongside all 
the others. Nevertheless, it really makes a difference!
What is a person?
We learn to distinguish between “people” or “persons,” “cats,” “rocks,” and 
“words” as we grow up. These are value-laden ordinary language concepts. 
Philosophers and theologians attempt to refine ordinary understandings 
using specialized philosophical or theological jargon. As Whitehead said, 
“Thus the very purpose of philosophy is to delve below the apparent clar-
ity of common speech” (AI 222).
In traditional non-process philosophy, persons are technically defined 
in terms of “substances” and “attributes,” following Boethius, who defined 
a “person” as an “individual substance of a rational nature” (84f ). Tra-
ditionally, rationality, as Aristotle said, is the essential defining attribute 
of human substances. Substances as such are the enduring, unchanging, 
and unexperiencable realities to which all predicates/properties/quali-
ties/relations (like rationality) belong. Substances have only a few skimpy 
identifying properties of their own: self-sufficiency (despite their obvious 
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contingency), endurance, changelessness, and foundational support for 
and ownership of changing qualities and relations. For the most part, 
they are just “supposed somethings we know not what.” They and their 
skimpy properties are never given to us in experience, as David Hume 
indicated. “Substance,” like “unicorn” is an intension without a corre-
sponding extension. It is a vacuous conceptual construct, an instance of 
Whitehead’s “misplaced concreteness.”
The traditional substance/attribute perspective affirms that all of us are 
the same changeless individual substances from birth to death, though 
many of our attributes (except for our “essences”—e.g., “rationality,” or 
“character”) are in a state of flux throughout our lives, some more so than 
others. Even rationality and character are not really as constant as they were 
once cracked up to be. We are only intermittently rational and are often 
out of character. Yet, self-identity through time is absolute in substance 
and essence according to traditional non-process philosophy. Dualistic 
philosophies further distinguish between mental and material substances, 
identifying “self ” only with non-spatial mental or conscious substances 
that are imprisoned in alien material or spatially extended bodies.
Persons in process thought
Process thought challenges traditional substance/attribute, mind/body 
dualisms. No absolutely enduring substances or essences exist; people are 
incredibly complex causally and temporally connected sets of concret-
izing happenings in time (events, occasions) in which eternal objects or 
properties/predicates inhere momentarily, perish, and transmit what they 
can of themselves into their immediate temporal successors. Self-identity 
through time is relative, not absolute, for there are no enduring, change-
less, and self-sufficient substances. Considering our actual properties, we 
are only relatively the same persons today that we were ten years ago, for 
many of our character traits (concretized universals or eternal objects) 
have changed, even if others persist. “Substance” (with its skimpy proper-
ties) is not one of our properties at any stage along life’s way. Repudiating 
substances in general involves rejecting both the distinction between 
mental and material substances, and the depreciation of embodiment 
that typically accompanies it. In process thought, consciousness or men-
tality (broadly understood) in human beings is inherently embodied. 
At fundamental levels, all spatially extended entities have psychological 
properties (even if only unconscious), and all psychological entities have 
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spatial properties. Because the primary emphasis of process thought is 
on time rather than space, mind/body dualism can be rejected—without 
getting rid of either minds or bodies.
Traditional philosophical empiricists are psychologically hung up on 
space, which is why they recognize the reality and validity only of “exter-
nal” sense experiences and their “material” world. This is why, for them, 
all girls are just “material girls.” And the rest of us also are only material 
beings having merely those sets of properties (extrinsic value properties, 
Hartman would say) that are given to us through our ordinary “external” 
senses of touch, sight, hearing, taste, and smell. By contrast, in process 
thought, experience is primarily temporal, and our most basic or primi-
tive experiences are temporal and subjective or psychological, not spatial 
and sensory. Whitehead held that receiving data and subjective forms 
(e.g., memories, purposes, feelings, thoughts, etc.) from the immediate 
predecessors of our momentarily existing selves is the most basic form of 
human experience (AI 180-84). Time, however it is analyzed, is meta-
physically and experientially fundamental, though noticing this seems to 
require some special philosophical talent and personal self-development. 
Space is integral to time, and time to space—hence “spacetime” rather 
than “space” versus “time.” 
Persons are temporally ordered “societies” of successive and causally 
connected spacetime occurrences or “occasions” of self-experience and 
creativity. A single person consists of that vast connected chain or stream 
of causally and creatively ordered temporal occasions that manifests itself 
between birth and death, including all the bodily processes, choices, 
thoughts, feelings, creative syntheses, and determinate eternal objects 
belonging to that stream. The stream of consciousness, the dominant 
temporally ordered society within the human body, is only the tip of the 
iceberg (though no less valuable for being so). An individual person is all 
of her or his properties from birth to death, whether they be occasions or 
relations, psychological or physical, conscious or unconscious, thinking 
or feeling, or whatever. But our properties are not exclusively spatial and 
sensory. On this, Hartman and process thinkers agree; and this enables 
both to making a legitimate place for what Hartman would call systemic 
and intrinsic, in addition to extrinsic, properties and values.
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Persons in Hartmanian axiology
How does Hartmanian axiology relate to this process understanding of 
human personhood? The best Hartmanian concept of unique individual 
human personhood I have been able to formulate is, “A unique individual 
person is the integrated totality of all of his or her properties (qualities 
and relations).” In short, we are “our total property inventory.” Hartman 
himself came very close to formulating this next definition when he wrote 
of “x’s self, i.e. the integral totality of all of x’s attributes” (“Nature” 15). 
Process philosophy emphasizes that all the temporal occasions of our past, 
present, and future belong to our total property inventory. Much that 
Hartman wrote adds up to this. He clearly regarded individual persons 
in their full determinateness, concreteness, and uniqueness as intrinsi-
cally good, as opposed to the extrinsic goodness of the “things” of the 
public sensory world, and the systemic worth of mere ideas or “concepts.” 
A unique or “singular” fact (like an individual person), he wrote, “has 
the full concreteness of all its properties” (Structure 96) It is “in a class 
all by itself ” (162). Taking Socrates as his example, Hartman wrote, “It 
is, I think, beyond doubt that the proper name ‘Socrates’ refers to all of 
Socrates and not to some section of his properties. It refers to the totality 
known and observed as Socrates” (“Singular” 26). Hartman recognized 
that “The individual exists in space and time. The concept of it is in the 
mind” (34), and he acknowledged that for many purposes we require 
concepts “where spatio-temporal existence itself is part of meaning” 
(36). He gave organismic intellectual and artistic creativity as examples 
(36-43). In another article, agreeing explicitly with process theologians, 
he treated “God” as such a concept, writing that God, “by the necessity 
of his nature, is continuously surpassing himself—a necessary ever self-
surpassing, self-concreting on-going” (“Value” 275) and that “Since God 
never exhausts his potentiality, the world is continually being created; and 
God and the world are continuously in the I/Thou relation of creativ-
ity. All past properties of the world were in God as predicates, that is, as 
thoughts to be realized; and all future properties of the world are in God 
as predicates to be realized” (278). 
Human beings, Hartman acknowledged, are constantly creative, thus 
constantly temporal, some much more creative than others, for “the vast 
majority of men stop at narrow ranges of creativity” (278). The tempo-
rality of the human self is more implicit in some of Hartman’s writings 
than explicit, though usually explicit enough. His whole axiological 
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psychology is about human self-development through time in multiple 
value dimensions. It pinpoints human shortcomings when self-develop-
ment in three dimensions takes place asymmetrically or does not take 
place as it should. He regularly emphasized the relationality of selfhood, 
often quoting with admiration Kierkegaard’s definition of the self as “a 
relation which relates itself to its own self ” (“Self ” 418). Hartman was 
not always as crystal clear about the temporality of human selfhood as 
he should have been, as I have explained elsewhere (“Some” 41-50) and 
this is where process thought can best contribute valid insight and clarity 
to Hartmanian philosophy.
Process thinkers stress that we are “relational” selves, as reflected in 
the titles of many recent books. We are largely constituted by subjective 
forms, purposes, aims, and data inherited through causal relations with 
a vast plethora of events in our past, especially our most immediate past; 
these include our own past creative decisions, God’s loving nurturing and 
nudging us toward what is best, our genetic and bodily endowment, our 
social relations with other people and living creatures, and a vast portion 
of the antecedent universe. The focus, though, is on time. If Hartmanian 
“selfhood” is to be reconciled with process selfhood, being “the integrated 
totality of all of our properties, both qualitative and relational,” must be 
qualified by temporality. “Having all of our properties” is not a done deal. 
At any given moment, we have a vast plethora of properties, both actual 
and possible, but our total set of actual properties is unfinished until 
death do us depart. Aristotle suggested that no one could be completely 
happy until he (or she) is dead, because something bad might happen 
in the future to spoil everything. Without getting bogged down in that, 
we should understand that none of us have all of our actual properties 
completely until we are dead—and not even then if there is survival after 
death with new events or happenings. We are temporally ordered selves, 
and “our total property inventory” is always unfinished as long as we 
live. Hartman wrote, “The outstanding feature of a dead person is that 
nothing happens with him anymore, that he is no source any more of 
properties or features” (“Singular” 43). He and process thinkers agree that 
we are appreciably self-creative; we are responsible co-creators with God 
of ourselves; and what our future selves will be like depends significantly 
on the decisions that we make here and now in the subjective immediacy 
and creativity of our present moment of what Whitehead called “sheer 
individuality” (AI 177).
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What kinds of properties constitute human selves and human well-
being? Here, Hartmanian axiology can significantly structure and enrich 
process thought. Hartman would answer in terms of three basic kinds 
of properties that correspond to three basic kinds of value—systemic, 
extrinsic, and intrinsic. All three are integral parts of our total property 
inventories and our unique personal worth.
Systemic properties are thought properties—ideas, concepts, words, 
beliefs, rules, laws, ritual forms, mathematics, logic, and such. Philosophi-
cal, theological, and scientific belief systems are composed of systemic 
properties or entities. To the extent that they are within us, they partly 
constitute who we are, our total property inventory. Systemic properties 
are systemic values, so we are partly composed of systemic values. As we 
think and learn conceptually, our systemic properties are enriched; the 
systemic parts of selfhood, of ourselves, are increased. 
Extrinsic properties are spatiotemporal properties existing in our 
common perceptual everyday world of spacetime. Philosophers tradition-
ally defined “extrinsic values” in terms of actual or potential usefulness. 
Without denying this, Hartman primarily emphasized their actual or 
potential existence as things, processes, and activities in our common 
public perceptual spacetime world—hereafter, “things,” for short. Colors, 
odors, sounds, tastes, shapes, sizes, motions, etc., and all their actual and 
possible combinations, no matter how intricate, are extrinsic properties. 
We value things in spacetime as extrinsic values to the degree that they 
fulfill our expectations of them, that is, fulfill the standards we apply 
to them, including overall usefulness. Our bodies consist of extrinsic 
properties that are integral parts of our total property inventories, thus 
integral aspects of who we really are. As we nurture and care for our 
bodies, we are enriched with good-making extrinsic properties. We also 
live in a spatiotemporal universe, a physical environment of things that 
can enrich (or impoverish) our experiences and our lives. As we take the 
properties of objectively existing spatiotemporal things into ourselves in 
sensory perception and affective appreciation, they become parts of our 
own personal property inventories, parts of ourselves, our extrinsic selves. 
To the extent that things fulfill our expectations and the standards we 
apply to them, they are extrinsically good.
Extrinsic value objects, as Hartman understood them, are grossly 
perceptual objects considered only as such, or only in the mode of “pre-
sentational immediacy,” as Whitehead might say, but still as causes or 
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means to ends. They are roughly the same as “aggregates” as understood 
in process thought—things, processes, and activities considered as devoid 
of consciousness or internal experiencing. Even human beings or bodies 
can be so considered. People and animals having their own streams of 
consciousness are often regarded and treated as “mere things,” and much 
immorality involves just that. 
The present emphasis on conscious human beings does not mean 
that there is no deeper experiencing or awareness in plant cells, atoms, 
or electrons, only that this is a separate issue that goes beyond the scope 
of this essay. So does the question of how much experiencing at those 
levels is conscious and how much unconscious. Hartmanian thought 
can be enriched by what process thinkers have had to say about ani-
mals and panpsychism, but panpsychists have to decide whether most 
experencing in the non-animal world is not unconscious (as is much 
human experiencing), and whether unconscious experiences and psychic 
properties have any intrinsic worth. Whitehead clearly held that no 
actualities are “vacuous,” that all actualities experience and have value 
(RM 100), but is that enough? Is having value exactly the same thing as 
having intrinsic value?
Intrinsic properties include all our properties, our total inventory, 
but some human properties are distinctively intrinsic; that is, they do not 
belong to our systemic and extrinsic property inventories—for example, 
our consciousness and self-awareness, with all their contents, capacities, 
and activities, including our creativity, and our abilities to identify with 
entities valued, to love, to empathize, to be compassionate. Uniquely 
intrinsic properties also include our moral and spiritual virtues like 
fulfilling our self-expectations, being true to ourselves, exercising self-
control, being courageous, fair or just, faithful, hopeful, honest, sincere, 
trustworthy, and the like. As we intensify and develop our intrinsic-value-
enhancing properties and capacities, our personal property inventory 
is enriched with the best personal good-making properties of all. Our 
distinctively intrinsic properties are integral parts of who we are, but so 
are our systemic and extrinsic properties. Our total enduring selves with 
all our properties, including the qualities, relations, and configurations 
that make us unique, are intrinsic goods, and we are ends to, in, and for 
ourselves. This claim about our intrinsic worth pertains to our total tem-
porally ordered unique selves, not just to the transient self of the present 
moment. Our distinctively intrinsic properties, including those at the 
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cores of our personalities, change, develop, increase, and enrich out total 
property inventories through time.
Much more could be said about Hartmanian axiology’s perspective 
on human selfhood, but this should get us started. More will be forth-
coming. Hartman himself would doubtless add that people have not 
just intrinsic but infinite worth because they have an infinite number 
of good-making properties, but I vehemently opposed this claim from 
the moment I first heard it and have published my objections to it in 
several places (e.g., “Value” 141-47). As I finally realized after many 
years, however, the good stuff in Hartmanian axiology can be separated 
from its occasional absurdities.
What axiology can contribute to process theology
I invite process thinkers to learn more about Hartmanian axiology because 
it can add significantly to their presently available thought structures and 
content. It can contribute significantly to hitherto neglected or underde-
veloped aspects of process thought. I will identify three such enrichments, 
though more could be said. To process thought, axiology can contribute 
greater order and clarity about:
• the definitions of “good,” “better,” and “best,”
• what things are intrinsically good, and
• the nature and value of unique, enduring, individual persons.
The definition of “good”
Axiology can contribute clarity and systematic orderliness to process 
philosophy’s answer to G.E. Moore’s first two questions of ethics, “What 
does “good” mean?” and “What things are good?” 
Let us start with the first, What does “good” mean? How shall we 
define this word or concept? Process thinkers frequently answer G.E. 
Moore’s second question, but they greatly neglect his first, which today 
we would classify as a “metaethical” question. They identify many good 
things—somewhat unsystematically, I should add—good things like truth, 
reason, knowledge, intense feeling, harmony, beauty, unity in variety, 
richness of experience, creativity, freedom, adventure, peace, enjoyment, 
self-enjoyment, love, compassion, etc. But they seldom if ever give us an 
analysis of the meaning of “good,” the concept that covers and applies to 
all such good things. They may think the question unimportant, or, in 
confusion, they may equate good things with the meaning of “good,” thus 
committing Moore’s infamous “naturalistic fallacy.” I am not the first to 
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notice process thought’s inadequacies in value theory and the treatment 
of “The Good”; Paul Arthur Schilpp, for example, noticed this fairly 
early in the game (563-618, especially 592ff); but these problems persist 
today. To get a sense for this, look for “good” in the indexes of the many 
books on process thought published in the last twenty-five years. You will 
not find it in most, and when you do find it, the references are to good 
things, not to goodness itself. Even with “Good” in the title, there is no 
index entry at all for “good” in Herman E. Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., 
For the Common Good. 
Hartman can do better. The “axiom” of his formal axiology is his defini-
tion of “good,” namely, “good is concept (or standard) fulfillment.” This 
is a real definition, despite G.E. Moore’s insistence that the concept is 
undefinable, but it is not a “naturalistic” definition that identifies “good” 
with “good things” like those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. As 
a formal definition, it gives “the form of the good,” the formal pattern 
common to all judgments of goodness. In common, all “X is good” 
judgments match the actual properties of some X with expectations for 
Xs, as contained and expressed in the predicates of someone’s concept of 
an ideal X. The properties of good Xs fulfill or match the predicates in 
the normative standards that we apply to them. Such properties are their 
“good-making” properties. A good X is as it is supposed to be; it has all 
relevant good-making properties. A fair X has most of them, an average 
X has about half, a poor X has relatively few, and a bad or no-good X 
has almost no such good-making properties at all. That is what “good” 
and degrees thereof mean. Our standards may vary and come from many 
sources, including traditions, influential others, or our own creative 
choices. As Hartman pointed out, this formal definition of good “is objec-
tive. It is valid for every rational being whatever . . . But its application 
is subjective” (Structure 110). We can debate and disagree about which 
standards to accept and apply; but the form of the good is always the 
same: good things exemplify the good-making properties of the concepts 
(sets of good-making predicates) that we apply to them. 
Good things measure up to their ideals. Consider an example. A pro-
cess understanding of “a good human life” will tell us that people have 
good lives to the extent that they exemplify “truth, reason, knowledge, 
intense feeling, harmony, beauty, unity in variety, richness of experience, 
creativity, freedom, adventure, peace, enjoyment, self-enjoyment, love, 
compassion, etc.” These good-life-making properties can be instantiated 
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by degrees, and most if not all of them are not distinctively human, so 
some people or animals may live only fair lives, average lives, poor lives, 
or no-good lives. Hartman explained all of this in considerable detail, and 
I have explicated and expanded his position in many places (Structure and 
Dicken Dialogues 181-210, 206-10), so I will not now go further. But 
I will say, “It really works!” and process thinkers would do well to take 
advantage of it. Related formal definitions of “better” and “best” will be 
given in the next section.
What things are good, better, best?
We now know how process thinkers tend to answer, “What things are 
good?” But how does Hartmanian axiology answer? Axiology affirms 
that there are different kinds of goodness or value, and that different 
things can be good in different value dimensions. There are at least 
three different kinds or dimensions of goodness, all involving concept 
or standard fulfillment: systemic value, extrinsic value, and intrinsic 
value. Systemic value is conceptual goodness. Ideas, concepts, words, 
beliefs, doctrines, philosophical, theological, and scientific systems, 
rules, laws, ritual forms, mathematics, logic, and the like are systemically 
good entities. Extrinsically good or valuable entities are “pragmatically” 
valuable objects, processes, and activities located in our common sen-
sory “external” world of space-time. Not all extrinsically good things 
are “external,” however, since our bodies and our activities involving 
them are extrinsically good and are integral parts of our total property 
inventory—our intrinsic goodness. Intrinsically good entities, ends in 
themselves, entities valuable for their own sakes, are individual persons 
and other unique conscious beings like God, animals, etc. The lives and 
experiences of intrinsically good beings may be enriched in many differ-
ent ways by desirable intrinsic-good-enriching properties or determinate 
“eternal objects” like appropriate feelings, moral and spiritual growth, 
and most of the good things mentioned in “The definition of ‘good.’” I 
call them “intrinsic value enhancers.”
Process thinkers are generally on the right track, I believe, when they 
tell us what things are good. The trouble is, their answers are diverse, 
selective, unsystematic, and often quite unclear. A review of the literature 
will find process thinkers affirming the goodness of all the good things 
mentioned previous section—truth, reason, knowledge, intense feeling, 
harmony, beauty, unity in variety, richness of experience, creativity, free-
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dom, adventure, peace, enjoyment, self-enjoyment, love, compassion, etc. 
Whitehead affirmed the value of all of these in various sections of Adven-
tures of Ideas. However, value-affirmations by process thinkers, including 
Whitehead, are often narrowly selective; here and there, particular items 
in this list receive special emphasis; the meanings of many of these items 
are often quite unclear; and no one offers a comprehensive value theory 
that differentiates between distinctive kinds of value or goodness and that 
pulls them all together into systematic axiological order. Here, Hartmanian 
axiology can do better and offer improvements.
The narrow selectivity of process thinkers comes out, for example, 
in the diverse ways in which they deal with God’s “aims” or “purposes” 
for the world. Logically, God could have quite different aims for the 
world, for human social orders, for inclusive individual persons, and for 
individual occasions. Logically also, God’s aims for all three could be the 
same, as process thinkers usually suggest. Consider the following diverse 
and highly selective accounts of God’s aim(s).
In Process and Reality, Whitehead affirmed that “God’s purpose in the 
creative advance is the evocation of intensities” (105), specifically “maxi-
mum depth of intensity of feeling” for every occasion (249, 27) I have 
long been troubled by this claim for at least three reasons. 
First, Whitehead makes no distinction here between desirable and 
undesirable feelings. Love and compassion are desirable “intrinsic value 
enhancing” feelings, and the more intense the better; hatred, despair, and 
physical suffering and anguish are undesirable “intrinsic value diminish-
ing” feelings, and the more intense the worse. Does God aim at, should 
each occasion aim, at maximum intensity of all such feelings? Here, 
Whitehead does not say otherwise. In fact, he does not even consider the 
problem; yet he should have. In traditional Christian theology, the Devil 
also aims at maximum intensity of feelings! In this quotation, Whitehead 
is both embarrassingly unclear in not distinguishing between desirable and 
undesirable feelings to be intensified, and highly selective in emphasizing 
only feelings. One might think that this problem could be resolved with 
Whitehead’s distinction between “positive” and “negative” prehensions 
(PR 35ff), but this is not so. Whitehead clearly does not say that God 
aims solely at positive prehensions, and the highly technical meaning 
that he gives to this distinction makes it irrelevant for present purposes, 
for he clearly did not identify positive prehensions with those devoid of 
pain and suffering, excruciating or not. 
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Second, what Whitehead meant by “feelings” is very unclear. As 
Jorge Luis Nobo pointed out, “The term ‘feeling’ is used ambiguously 
by Whitehead” (28). Whitehead’s term seems almost synonymous with 
“experiencing,” broadly understood as processing data with subjective 
forms. This clearly does not avoid the above difficulty, for there are hor-
rible as well as wonderful modes of experiencing, both of which can be 
powerfully intensified. Ordinarily, when we want to distinguish feelings 
from such things as thinking and acting, we limit “feelings” to emotions, 
desires, pleasures, and pains. Hartman seems to have so limited “feelings,” 
and at least some of Whitehead’s remarks like the one above might be so 
construed. Still, we definitely would not want all of our feelings in this 
sense to be intensified! Some emotions, desires, and pain sensitivities are 
quite undesirable. In other contexts, Whitehead recognizes this, as when 
he writes of aesthetic destructiveness, that “This is the feeling of evil in the 
most general sense, namely physical pain or mental evil, such as sorrow, 
horror, dislike.” (AI 256; compare RM 95). Too bad that he did not give 
this qualification when speaking of God’s aim for the world!
Third, Whitehead’s emphasis on feelings alone, even if we give him 
the benefit of the doubt about touting only desirable ones, was nar-
rowly one-sided, in addition to being unclear. His affirmation of God’s 
aim for the world in the above quote might mean that God aims at the 
intensification of emotions, desires, pleasures, and pains. Even if we omit 
pains, these feelings belong to but do not exhaust the realm of intrinsic 
goodness, and considering feelings alone totally neglects extrinsic and 
systemic goodness. Human beings trying to follow Whitehead’s advice 
about intensifying feelings might “aim” exclusively at intensifying emo-
tions, desires, and pleasures,  nothing more, but they would be practically 
inept and mentally stupid! Results from the Hartman Value Profile, an 
exceptionally powerful personality profile, show that some real people are 
like this; we might call them “romanticists” or “love slobs.” They have an 
intrinsic value astigmatism; they are somewhat developed intrinsically (in 
emotions and other feelings) but poorly developed practically (extrinsi-
cally) and conceptually (systemically). Whitehead may not have meant to 
be so one-sided in this value pronouncement, but perhaps he was!
To his credit, Whitehead was not always so narrowly focused in 
identifying “aims.” “Morality,” he wrote, “is always the aim at that union 
of harmony, intensity, and vividness which involves the perfection of 
importance for that occasion” (MT 14). Even this expanded formula-
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tion of aims suffers from indefiniteness and narrowness. Its three value 
properties, harmony, intensity, and vividness, leave us wondering: What 
kind(s) of harmony, intensity, and vividness? If limited to harmonious, 
intense, and vivid feelings, we have made little progress. Should some-
thing more than mere feelings be harmonized, intensified, and vividified? 
Why not a harmony, intensity, and vividness of systemic, extrinsic, and 
intrinsic values? 
We must ask also, “Harmony, intensity, and vividness for whom?” 
Whitehead’s answer here seems very unsatisfactory: “for that occasion.” 
Is morality really so narrowly focused that it aims only for something 
that endures for a fraction of a second—“that occasion”? Surely not! 
Why not add, “over the long run for everyone and every future occasion 
affected”? Again, to his credit, Whitehead did recognize the importance 
of aims toward the future. He wrote that “subjective aim, whereby there 
is origination of conceptual feeling, is at intensity of feeling (α) in the 
immediate subject, and (β) in the relevant future,” and he acknowledged 
that “morality hinges on the determination of relevance in the future” 
(PR 27). Cobb clearly points morality toward the future:
First, we are called to realize value in each moment. Second, we are 
called to determine the present in such a way that it will contribute 
value to the future. Whitehead thinks of the former aspect of the 
goal as primarily aesthetic, the latter as moral. But the moral aim 
for future occasions is primarily at their realization of aesthetic value 
in the future. (110)
Again, why not the realization of intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic 
values, not just aesthetic values, in the future?
“Harmony, intensity, and vividness” is how most process thinkers 
define “beauty” (53). Whitehead himself said that “The teleology of 
the Universe is directed to the production of Beauty” (AI 265). Beauty 
often seems to be the most fundamental value of all in process thought, 
but I question this. Beauty is only an abstraction, an eternal object, but 
it is not an actual entity, a concretely existing conscious individual, not 
even when actualized. Does beauty as such have intrinsic worth, or is it 
valuable only because it enriches the lives of enduring concretely existing 
conscious individuals—people, animals, God? Do repeatable abstractions, 
i.e., eternal objects (or systemic value objects), have intrinsic worth, or 
does intrinsic worth belong only or primarily to concretely existing con-
scious individuals? Could abstractions like “beauty” or “truth” or “peace” 
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ever have intrinsic worth in, to, and for themselves? Beauty, truth, and 
peace as such have no mind or individuated consciousness of their own. 
Whitehead defines “intrinsic importance” as “importance for itself,” (MT 
118), and he speaks of “aesthetic worth for its own sake” (MT 119), but in 
what sense could beauty, truth, or peace have importance for themselves? 
How could beauty have worth for its own sake? Would G.E. Moore’s 
absolutely beautiful world that no conscious individual, not even God, 
ever experiences have intrinsic worth? Although process thinkers often 
intimate that beauty is axiologically fundamental, perhaps they should 
reconsider. Actual entities are metaphysically fundamental; why are they 
not also axiologically fundamental? If aesthetics is the intrinsic valuation 
of beauty, and ethics is the intrinsic valuation of persons (or experiencing 
entities), why isn’t ethics more fundamental than aesthetics? Not beauty 
as such, but beauty-for us, beauty-as-enhancing-concrete-individuals, is 
what has intrinsic worth. When Whitehead wrote, “Beauty is the mutual 
adaptation of the several factors in an occasion of experience” (AI 252 
and following), he moved in this direction, except that “for us” is more 
enduring than “an occasion.” In most discussions of beauty and aesthetics 
as fundamental in process thought, the “an occasion” or “for us” part is 
greatly neglected. My point is not that this is altogether missing, but that 
it deserves much more emphasis. 
Other recent process pronouncements about God’s aims or purposes 
for the world and for human beings are also axiologically incomplete, 
indefinite, and lacking in clarity. Consider next some examples from 
The Call of the Spirit: Process Spirituality in a Relational World by John 
B. Cobb, Jr., Bruce G. Epperly, and Paul S. Nancarrow. The authors of 
this book say that God aims at, and we should aim at, what is best. As 
Cobb puts it, “God calls us to be and to do what is best” (24, 110, and 
compare Epperly, 124). No account of the meaning of “best” is given, 
and, though Cobb mentions “aesthetic value,” he offers no relevant details 
(110), perhaps because he has done so elsewhere. 
That “We are called to be and to do what is best” invites additional 
axiological questions. Process thinkers neglect both the definition of 
“good” and the definition of “best.” How do these authors define “best”? 
We get no answer. Formal axiology offers plausible and useful definitions 
of both “good” and “best.” We saw that “good” involves exemplifying the 
good-making properties in the relevant set of norms or standards. “Better” 
and “best” also involve sets of good-making properties. If X and Y belong 
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to the same class of comparison, X is better than Y if X has more relevant 
good-making properties than Y. X is the best of the lot if it exemplifies 
more good-making properties than the others in its class of comparison. 
X would be absolutely best (like God) if it exemplifies all consistently 
combinable good-making properties—including the property of creat-
ing free and co-creative creatures. Hartman defined “better” in terms of 
“richness.” “Better” means “Richer in properties,” he wrote (Structure 
114). Adding “good-making” to his definition improves it (“richer in 
good-making properties”), because “worse” and “worst” involve richness 
in properties—bad-making ones, though Hartman never realized this. By 
extension, “best” means “richest in good-making properties,” and “worst” 
means “richest in bad-making properties” (“Value” 208). I wholeheartedly 
agree with Cobb’s claim that “God calls us to be and to do what is best.” 
Process thinkers are definitely on the right track, but I would add that 
this means, axiologically, that God calls us to live lives that are as rich as 
we can make them in good-making properties of all kinds, that is, in all 
value dimensions. 
Cobb and Nancarrow also emphasize richness of experience, which 
they only sketchily explain and illustrate. Cobb writes that “God calls 
each human occasion of experience to actualize the richest possibility in 
the new moment” (31), and Nancarrow suggests that “God’s purpose in 
the world is the evocation of ever-richer forms of experience” (53, 55, 
90, 131, 135). But what does this “richness” involve? Richness of what? 
Richness cannot credibly be reduced to intense positive feelings, to aes-
thetic abstractions, or to any one value dimension—the intrinsic alone, 
the extrinsic alone, or the systemic alone. A human life that exemplifies 
maximal richness in all three value dimensions is better (richer) than a 
life that is almost exclusively intrinsic, or extrinsic, or systemic. A truly 
abundant individual human life requires optimal personal development 
in all three dimensions of value; otherwise, a life even richer in good-
making properties is conceivable. People who do not develop in all three 
value dimensions are “axiologically challenged” and end up with serious 
“problems in living,” as psychologists might put it. God is that reality 
than whom none richer in all dimensions of consistently combinable 
good-making properties can be conceived, including constantly creative 
self-surpassing.
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The value of unique, enduring, individual persons
So what is the primary value of unique, enduring, individual persons, 
according to process thought? To answer, we must return to our original 
problem, “What is a person?” and to a central affirmation of Hartmanian 
axiology, “Individual persons are intrinsically good.” 
Whitehead emphasized “the importance of the individual” (AI 292) 
and “the intrinsic importance of an experience,” which means “importance 
for itself ” (MT 118). However, we cannot infer from “an experience” 
that he thought that enduring individual persons are either important 
or intrinsically good. In process thought, beginning with Whitehead, the 
only real individuals are momentary temporal occasions, enduring only 
fractions of a second (AI 177, 186). Whitehead affirmed importance and 
intrinsic worth for these, but did he also do so clearly enough for persons 
in the “ordinary” sense of the term—persons as existing from birth to 
death, individuals in a more enduring and inclusive sense? He spoke of 
actual occasions as having importance, intrinsic worth, or existing for 
their own sake. However, “Do I, do other people, have intrinsic worth?” 
is not usually a question about the self of the fleeting moment. It is about 
something much more enduring and inclusive. 
Standard process metaphysics does give us an analysis of the consti-
tution of inclusive human persons, what Whitehead called “enduring 
individualities” (AI 280-81). Technically, inclusive persons are not 
individuals. Ordinary persons are societies—vastly complex temporally 
enduring and spatially extended collections of momentary occasions. 
These relatively abiding societies are unified by common and intimate 
strands of causation. The events of which we are composed share common 
lines of inheritance and common “subjective forms.” In more familiar 
language, our “souls” or “selves” have personal identity and our “char-
acters” have continuity through time because certain memories, desires, 
aims, purposes, emotions, convictions, etc., endure and persist relatively 
unchanged over large spans of our lives. Today and tomorrow we are 
and will be relatively the same persons we were yesterday and the day 
before because our past feelings, purposes, experiences, memories, etc., 
are repeated and intimately included in what we are now and in what we 
will be in the future. 
Axiologists emphasize that we are the “same persons” through time 
because our values and our patterns of valuation tend to persist. What and 
how we value, our values and valuations, are the real things that make us 
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who we are now and over the course of time. Yet, we do and can change, 
and, using the Hartman Value Profile, axiologists know how to measure 
both the enduring and the changing aspects of personal identity, continu-
ity, and discontinuity. (To learn more about the HVP, go to: <http://www.
hartmaninstitute.org/TheHartmanValueProfile/tabid/57/Default.aspx>.) 
Personal identity is valuationally three dimensional, not just one dimen-
sional, not just a matter of feelings. We inherit and transmit to the future 
not only common intrinsic subjective forms (purposes, feelings, desires 
etc.), but also persevering extrinsic behavioral propensities and persisting 
systemic ideas, thoughts, convictions, and beliefs. All of these values we 
now know how to rank and measure, and all are constitutive of our total 
property inventories.
Unique enduring persons are embodied (spatially extended) souls insep-
arably conjoined by common causal inheritances, structures, properties, 
and concreteness. We are not disembodied souls temporarily imprisoned 
in our bodies. Whitehead identified the human “soul” with our human 
stream of consciousness, or with what he called the “dominant personal 
society” (AI 206) within the human body, pointing out that souls exists 
only intermittently because of sleep (MT 162). “The soul is nothing else 
than the succession of my occasions of experience, extending from birth to 
present moment. Now, at this instant, I am the complete person embodying 
all these occasions” (163, italics added). Souls are inherently embodied 
and inclusive; our intimate sense or feeling of union with our bodies is a 
“primary experience.” Soul/body unity is a primary reality. Both bodies 
and souls are integral parts of who we are, and we normally just take this 
for granted without lapsing into Platonic/Cartesian mind-matter dualism. 
As Whitehead remarked, “No one ever says, Here am I, and I have brought 
my body with me” (114). In axiological terms, our extrinsic selves (I act, 
etc., therefore, I am) are just as much a part of our total property inventory 
as our intrinsic selves (I feel, etc., therefore, I am) and our systemic selves 
(I think, etc., therefore, I am). If being an enduring actual/potential field 
of or for consciousness is one of our properties, that, too, is included.
Whitehead conceived of “personal unity” or “personal identity” along 
lines remarkably similar to axiology’s “our total property inventory.” He 
compared it, not to Plato’s “Soul,” but to Plato’s “Receptacle,” the reposi-
tory of all natural events. He wrote that “personal identity is the thing 
which receives all occasions of the man’s existence” (AI 187). Yes, he 
regarded each individual occasion as having intrinsic importance, but what 
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about our total property inventory? What about our total unique personal 
unity or identity, the inclusive “I”? Whitehead’s answer is fuzzy, if it can 
be found at all, and so it is with later process thinkers. Yet, this is the vital 
question that most of us want answered. Are inclusive enduring persons, 
not just our fleeting moments, intrinsically good? Do we unique human 
beings from birth to death have intrinsic worth? Could we be inclusive 
ends in, to, and for ourselves, if metaphysically we are only relatively 
coherent and causally connected societies of temporal occasions? Does the 
process metaphysics of persons as societies of evanescent occasion really 
account for the significance that we attach to enduring persons as ends in 
themselves? Inferring that wholes have a certain property (e.g., intrinsic 
worth) just because each part has that property commits the informal 
logical fallacy of composition, so we cannot infer logically that we as 
enduring persons, but still in process, have intrinsic worth just because all 
of our momentary parts or occasions do. By the same logic, we as enduring 
persons could have intrinsic worth even if, though unlikely, none of our 
single occasions do. In the end, we must reach the conclusion that our 
total property inventory has intrinsic worth in the same way that we reach 
the conclusion that our fleeting moments have intrinsic worth. Namely, 
we must, and we do, find after careful and persistent consideration that 
this axiomatic judgment accords with our deepest, most enduring, and 
most carefully considered intuitions of worth. Enduring judgments and 
determinations of intrinsic worth are so basic, I doubt that they can be 
derived logically from anything else, though we can say things that help 
bring these intuitions up into the light of consciousness where they can 
be carefully considered. Perhaps God provides us with such very basic 
axiological intuitions as a way of luring us toward what is best.
Cobb wrote, “From a Whiteheadian perspective, the absence of any 
substantial identity through time does not necessarily lead to disparaging 
an emphasis on personal identity. We do inherit most of what we are in 
each moment from antecedent moments of personal experience. . . .There 
can, therefore, be spiritualities based on enduring personal existence in 
distinction from those that focus on momentary existence” (27). My 
complaint is not that process thinkers entirely neglect total or enduring 
selfhood in favor of momentary selfhood, only that what they say about 
this needs deeper analysis, greater emphasis, and a process metaphysics that 
allows for enduring selfhood. I add once more that Hartmanian axiology 
can help. Hartman had a lot to say about how we value as well as what we 
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value. He distinguished systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic valuation partly 
in terms of the kinds of concepts fulfilled in each, and partly by different 
degrees of personal and emotional involvement. A continuum of feeling 
runs from the minimal involvement of systemic valuation, through the 
everyday pragmatic interestedness of extrinsic valuation, to the intense 
personal involvement of intrinsic valuation. In optimal intrinsic valuation, 
we identify completely with what we value, so that it becomes an integral 
part of ourselves; and the differences, though they do not disappear, no 
longer matter.
Process thought could be deepened by the insight that we do in fact 
identify with our unified total temporal selves in many morally and spiritu-
ally significant ways, whereas we almost never consciously identify ourselves 
with our momentary psychic pulsations. Expressed axiologically, we do 
intrinsically evaluate ourselves, our “enduring individualities,” as having 
intrinsic worth, as ends in ourselves, as valuable our own sakes. In our more 
moral moments, we also evaluate other people that way, though the scope 
of our intrinsic concern for others is often pathetically limited. Moral and 
spiritual growth consists largely in expanding the scope of our intrinsic 
concern for and with ourselves and other enduring individualities. 
Valuing our enduring unified individualities intrinsically means partly 
that we know, experience, and have fulfilled concepts of ourselves, and 
partly that we intensely identify psychologically and axiologically with 
ourselves, with our own past, present, and future. Abnormality excepted, 
we usually have a concept of and strongly identify with our past, present, 
and future selves, our enduring selves, whether they be good or bad. Pro-
cess views of the self as a society of momentary occasions harbors ongoing 
puzzles about the unity of enduring personhood. How can a present actual 
occasion be and feel responsible for past decisions and actions when they 
were made by different actual occasions that have long since perished? 
How can a present actual occasion be concerned about distinct future 
actual occasions that do not yet exist? The answer must be that we primar-
ily identify axiologically and psychologically with our unified enduring 
individualities, not with our momentary selves, and something about us 
gives us the capacity to do that. What Whitehead might call “continuity 
of subjective form” has more value, a profound intrinsic value, that many 
process thinkers have greatly neglected, especially those most influenced 
by Hartshorne. But more than mere subjective forms and societies of 
occasions may be involved.
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By some process accounts, God is a single, enduring, continuously 
concrescing actual entity (Edwards, “God” 42-47; What “ 244-53); could 
there be shadows and images of such divine things within creation? I sug-
gested this possibility in a 1975 article in Process Studies (“The Human 
Self ”). Perhaps embodied (spatially extended) souls, both human and 
divine, are neither unchanging substances nor mere societies of constantly 
perishing occasions. Rather, souls or selves are enduring fields that partly 
structure, and in turn are given content by, the particular events and 
societies of occasions that occur within them. Physical (spatially extended) 
fields (e.g., gravitational, electromagnetic, and quantum) are not flickering 
occasions. Rather, they are enduring, structured, but invisible wholes or 
regions of spacetime that impose a certain kind of order upon the parts 
or occasions that they contain. So it is with enduring souls.
More influenced by Whitehead than Hartshorne, but willing to make 
modifications, is Lewis Ford, who developed in some depth the idea 
that human selves are enduring actual entities (not societies) with open 
concrescence, meaning that they do not have to perish first in order to 
achieve unity and produce effects beyond themselves (291-318). This, 
I think, is exactly what process thinkers need if they are going to take 
ethics seriously, and if they are going to be taken seriously as ethicists. 
Without something like this, process thinkers cannot account adequately 
for people and their  worth. The way we actually experience and value 
ourselves and our personal unity is much better expressed metaphysically 
in terms of continuously concrescing enduring fields than in terms of 
transmitted subjective forms and societies of fleeting actual occasions. In 
his many publications, Joseph A Bracken has proposed that we “rethink 
the nature of Whiteheadian societies as structured fields of activity for 
their constituent actual occasions” (“Field” 312. See also “Energy-Events” 
and “Continuity”). I propose that at least some such structured fields are 
unified and relatively enduring actual entities with open concrescence.
To expand on the value of our unified enduring selves, we highly value 
and identify ourselves with many enduring states of character or dispo-
sitions, with virtues like prudence, courage, temperance, justice, faith, 
hope, and love. We may also highly disvalue (regret, repudiate, repent 
of, forgive) and refuse to identify ourselves with many enduring states of 
character, with vices like imprudence, cowardice, overindulgence, unfair-
ness, faithlessness, despair, and hatred. None of these can exist only for an 
instant; their very conception as well as their realization require personal 
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endurance and positive personal identification with enduring selfhood. 
The intense concentration involved in significant creativity—like freeing 
the statue of David from the block of marble that encompasses it—requires 
unified personal endurance; when we value non-trivial creativity, we are 
valuing that endurance. Self-realization of the enduring self is axiologi-
cally significant; being a self takes time; realizing a self takes time. We 
desire to be integrated persons free from conflicting interests, desires, 
and goals; but integrated selfhood also takes a considerable amount of 
time. We plan ahead, develop our talents, pursue our careers, raise our 
children, and prepare for retirement, etc., as if doing so for ourselves, as 
well as for others. Intrinsic valuation of ourselves involves a prolonged, 
intense, positive axiological orientation toward our enduring futures, as 
well as toward our pasts and presents. 
According to Robert S. Hartman, intrinsic valuation of ourselves 
involves fulfilling our concepts of our enduring selves, realizing our 
“self-images,” “self-ideals,” or “plans of life,” as they are often called. This 
happens only over the “long run,” never in a single actual occasion; yet, 
this unified enduring individuality is what really matters to us, and process 
thought needs to account better for this. We care deeply about our real 
potentialities over the long run, not just about our present actualities. 
Sadly, many people are so shortsighted that their “long run” is not very 
long, but, again, moral and spiritual growth consists largely in expand-
ing the scope of this “long run.” Self-love and love of neighbors focus 
on and identify with unified enduring individualities and judge them to 
have intrinsic worth. 
Finally, the very process of evaluating our enduring individualities 
itself takes time and is not accomplished in a momentary self-occa-
sion. As Whitehead pointed out, thinking the thought, “United Fruit 
Company,” takes time, requires ongoing intentions and concentrations, 
and is not accomplished in an instant (AI 182). By the same token, the 
most important judgments that we make about ourselves, our cognitive 
self-valuations, take time—judgments like “I did a bad thing,” “I am 
responsible for doing a bad thing,” “I am true (or untrue) to myself,” “I 
love myself,” “I love you,” “I love God,” etc. No single actual occasion 
can think such thoughts. The cognitive aspects of valuation are very sig-
nificant to us, but they are not accomplished in a tenth of a second (the 
conventional process assessment of the duration of an actual occasion 
within a human self ). Being moral, being spiritual, being a good person, 
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fulfilling our ideal concepts of ourselves, self-realization, all take time and 
involve a unique field of enduring individuality, which is at the very heart 
of the values we cherish most dearly.
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